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State v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. (Ayden A.), 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 33 (April 28, 2016)1 
 
FAMILY LAW-CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
Summary 
NRS 432B.6075 governs emergency admission of children with emotional disturbances 
to facilities for their protection, and requires a petition for continuance of admission after an 
emergency admission within five days of the involuntary placement.2  Based on N.R.C.P. 6(a), 
which governs the computing of time for judicial purposes, the Court held that the five day 
limitation on filing a petition was based on judicial, not calendar, days.  The Court granted the 
State’s petition for a writ of mandamus, directing the district court to vacate its order denying the 
State’s NRS 432B petition.  
 
Background 
Ayden A., a minor, was admitted to West Hills Hospital because he was deemed to be 
emotionally disturbed. Exactly one week later, the State filed a petition, pursuant to NRS 
Chapter 432B, to extend emergency admission. The next day, at a hearing on the petition, the 
State argued that the five day statutory limit meant business days; Ayden argued that the petition 
was untimely because the statutory limit meant calendar days. The district court ruled in favor of 
Ayden. Ayden was subsequently released. 
 
Discussion 
 
This case presents an issue that is capable of repetition yet evading review 
 
The State argued that the Court should hear its case, because although the instant matter 
was moot, the underlying issue of law needed clarification.  The Court noted that a moot issue 
may be considered on appeal if the issue met the following factors: "(1) the duration of the 
challenged action is relatively short, (2) there is a likelihood that a similar issue will arise in the 
future, and (3) the matter is important."3  The Court held that the current issue fell within the 
exception because of the necessarily temporary time frame of the involuntary admissions; the 
likelihood that the State, if not Ayden, would need to rely on a correct interpretation of the 
statutory time limit; and because the interpretation of the time limit could affect individual 
liberty, it was deemed important.  
 
“5 days” in NRS 432B.0675 are necessarily judicial days 
 
The Court noted that the text of the statute did not indicate a computation method for the 
time limit, and thus declared the case a matter of statutory interpretation.  As the computation 
method for time limits in Nevada is laid out in NRCP 6(a), the Court agreed that it would apply 
to NRS 432B. "NRCP 6(a), by its own terms, applies to the computation of any period of time 
prescribed or allowed by the NRCP, local rules of the district court, by an order of the court, or 
                                                          
1 By Audra Powell 
2 NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.6075. 
3 Bisch v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 36, 302 P.3d 1108, 1113 (2013). 
by any applicable statute.”4 The Court noted that there are exceptions under which NRCP 6(a) 
would not apply, but only if the statute specifically conflicts with NRCP 6(a).5  The Court noted 
that it had considered legislative intent, which it admitted “might support Ayden's position that 
the Legislature intended the five-day cap to refer to calendar days” but concluded that NRCP 6(a) 
should apply.  
 
Conclusion 
 Because the district court applied the improper calculation of time to the State’s NRS 
432B petition, and thus denied it as untimely, the Court granted the State’s petition for a writ of 
mandamus and ordered the district court to vacate its order.  
 
                                                          
4 Morrow v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 10, 294 P.3d 411, 415 (2013). 
5 See Joanna T. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 77, 357 P.3d 932 (2015). 
